By Prof. Kanbawza Win
Even those who do not want or admire democracy may reconcile themselves to it if they believe there is no other way to remain in power, or to increase the international standing of their country. It is by now widely accepted that the democratic requirement for membership in the EEC was "an important incentive for the consolidation of democratic processes in the Iberian Peninsula," Greece, and now Turkey. Some African regimes are liberalizing now not only because of indigenous pressures but because they rightly perceive the climate of international opinion. This kind of pressure should be maintained formalized and escalated in the case of Burma. All aids, with the exception of emergency humanitarian aid, should be conditioned on respect for human rights and movement towards democracy.
Implementing stringent sanctions is the most effective policy in seeking political change in Burma. Like many other military regimes in Southeast Asia’s history, power and access to riches go hand in hand. The same is true for Burma, except military control is even more formal. The Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are the two major industrial conglomerates controlled by the military, and they have managed to dominate many of the key economic sectors of the country. The junta’s domination of the economy is intended to enable it to outflank any sort of pressure to share political power. For a regime whose power is based on the repression of human rights and political aspirations of the people, economic growth and prosperity is seen as an alternative source of legitimacy. Economic sanctions and campaigns against foreign investment in Burma have effectively prevented this strategy for political legitimacy from succeeding in Rangoon.
Moreover, sanctions create pressure against the SPDC’s base of its political power by threatening the military leadership’s relationship with the middle and lower level officer corps. In an army where forced conscription and child soldiers are common, maintaining control means keeping the loyalty of the officers. Economic sanctions reduce the size of the "economic pie" from which the SPDC can slice pieces for its patronage networks, and creates additional hardship for low- and mid-level military families.
Furthermore, when the economy is weakened by sanctions, pressure grows on the Burmese army to rely increasingly on seizures of land and property, and forced labor projects—mostly agricultural—to supplement the incomes of officers. Economic repression in these areas creates additional popular resentment against the military, and builds support for political change. The dearth of foreign investors also has a psychological effect that strikes at the Burmese army's perception of self as highly competent managers of national affairs, creating further pressure for change from the general populace and, potentially, from within the military.
Sanctions have forced the Western Companies to force out and the Junta reliance on the Chinese firms is increased. Rather than a negative, this trend should be viewed as positive, since it serves to increase resentment of the general populace, as well as nationalistic Burma Army officers, against the leadership of the SPDC that is making policy. Steinberg points this out, when he says, "If the Burmese perceive that Chinese control is too great, they may take out their anger against their own government…" If Chinese economic investments are threatened, and international opinion continues to move strongly against the SPDC, it cannot be discounted that behind-the-scenes Chinese government pressure may be forthcoming to improve political conditions as a way to defuse building anti-Chinese pressure.
Extension of economic sanctions also provides critical bargaining leverage to internal Burmese democrats, led by the NLD. In a bargaining situation where the NLD has only principles and popular support (one which is ignored by the regime, and the second which cannot be mobilized without casualties), the power to reduce the burden of international sanctions is a significant bargaining chip. Most observers agree that Aung San Suu Kyi’s words matter greatly in Western capitals, and influence North American and European policy toward Burma.
In the case of Burma, US can do a lot other than half-hearted sanctions (allowing the American Oil Companies to work in Burma). The U.S. must develop a proactive policy to deal comprehensively on Burma. The U.S. needs to expand efforts to de-legitimize the Burmese Junta internationally and must work with allies to apply economic and political pressure on the junta. The U.S. should support stronger action at the United Nations as expelling them from the UN or taking the problem to the Security Council. It should toughened multilateral sanctions, in concert with the ILO and call for governments to critically review their relationships with Rangoon. Given the flood of heroin entering the US from Burma, the administration should invoke a national security exemption (citing the Government Procurement Agreement) with regard to the World Trade Organization to fend off future attempts to overturn selective purchasing laws. Grassroots activists will certainly continue a concerted campaign of trade-related tactics to target US, European, and Asian companies invested in Burma, and the US government should not put obstacles in their way, based on misguided appeals to free trade
One of the first steps the US should take is to increase resources for cross-border humanitarian assistance (food and medicine) to the internally displaced population while marshalling greater international attention to the plight of the ethnic peoples of Burma. Washington should also proactively work with the Royal Thai government to broaden its definition of a refugee, allow Shan camps to be established, and ensure that no involuntary repatriations occur. US policy correctly urges a tripartite dialogue between equals—the Junta the NLD, and ethnic leaders. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wrote that dialogue should be aimed at achieving a “negotiated settlement acceptable to major political forces in our country". The main issue for U.S. foreign policy towards Burma is to use more forceful political economic and military leverage to accomplish a sustained dialogue leading to a just settlement. In this aspect it is to be noted that the Junta will never negotiate unless from the position of strength. So the US must strengthen the ethno-democratic forces in several ways including showering resources to the multi ethnic unified forces to stand up to the onslaught of the Burmese army. Daw Suu has amply said that the question of sanctions could be easily thrashes out once the NLD and the Junta sits down and talks but the Junta refused. Hence to bring these men in uniforms to the negotiation table the ethno-democratic forces needs a certain amount of leverage and a fang to show that it can bite.
Other than the moral aspect the NLD inside Burma cannot do much because of the severe restrictions. The choice is now on the peripherals and the Burmese Diaspora. In the meantime the EN groups has grown and it seems that soon they will be in a position to take the initiative as they infuse more intelligentsia community into it. It is still to be seen of how they will co-operate with the numerous Burma groups.
The US must spend more, to assist new and struggling democracies and to support the development of democratic institutions in government, politics, and society. All three forms of aid for democracy -- development assistance, political assistance, and short-term economic relief -- are urgently needed in the struggling countries and Burma is not the exception. All require higher levels of funding than this country has been willing to commit in recent years.