But, I also find the article interesting for other reasons as well, in particular the way it represents a typical outsider/western viewpoint on the problems in Burma. As tends to be the case with outside perspectives, it can miss important details that are obvious from the inside. As tends to be the case with ‘Western’ perspectives, it takes a somewhat short-sighted view of the history and politics of the region. Coming from ‘modern’ nations, where our national identity tends to be linked more with the present and future than the past, we often forget the depth of history in Asia, and the importance it plays in the minds of the people. Don’t get me wrong, the author of the aforementioned article is obviously intelligent, and its a decent piece, but I will still proceed to poke holes in it.
From the article:
First, it must be appreciated that democratisation is a process, not an event. The Free Burma Coalition quotes David Potter's definition: "Political change moving in a democratic direction from less accountable to more accountable government, from less competitive (or non-existent) elections, to fuller and fairer elections, from weaker (or non-existent) autonomous associations to more autonomous and numerous associations in civil society." Thus democratisation can be called a process of change. The US approach to date - sanctions and isolation - by concentrating on the end product of free and fair elections in Myanmar, has ignored the process of democratic transformation.*
Well, this is essentially true. Democracy is a process, and the US approach has focused on the single event of free and fair elections. But, to follow the given definition, Burma is not starting from zero in this process. Burma has a thriving civil society, it’s just mainly in exile. But once individuals have the freedom to return, they will. The people of Burma aren’t ignorant of political processes, they are merely lacking the opportunity to engage in them within their own country.
Similarly, the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party, demands that any "process of national reconciliation" be begun by convening the Pyithu Hluttaw (parliament) elected in 1990. This might seem to be the ideal result. At least three objections can be made to this entrenched position, however. Firstly, it is entirely unrealistic. 15 years is more than enough evidence that the generals aren't about to be overcome by conscience and reinstate the 1990 election result. Secondly, it ignores the fact that democracy tends to be brought about after a process, rather than as a one-off event.
No, the SPDC has made no indication that they will convene the parliament. The NLD is the majority elected party of the legitimate Burmese government - but they are not Burma. They don’t have a great deal of power beyond the moral authority they carry within the international community. One could argue that they can, and should, be doing more to lead their country and the people. But it's a mistake to approach the situation as if the NLD is the only political party from Burma - or the only group engaged in activism. As an elected party, they provide a guide by which the international community can develop their own efforts for the struggle. But there are thousands of Burmese citizens, of every ethnic group, who are everyday struggling to win their country back, and in the process, preparing for the task of building a democracy. If you only consider the NLD, then yes, it would appear that overthrowing the generals is the ultimate goal, but no one here, particularly the ethnic political groups, are foolish enough to believe that. They know full well that overthrowing the generals is but one step in the process to building a democracy - and to equal rights, and some openly disagree with the NLD's position to that end. In fact, convening the Pyithu Hluttaw under the old constitution won’t even solve all the problems there. No one is ignoring the process, but the reconciliation process, to heal not only the havoc wreaked by the SPDC, but also the ethnic conflict that’s been happening since 1949, simply cannot occur within the country until the generals are gone. Overthrowing the SPDC is not the goal, but it is a critical step within the process.
how developed a state institutions are, its ethnic and cultural make-up, the standard of education and wealth of a population, the state's history and so on - will sometimes dictate how self-determination should be viewed. For example, Germany in 1945 was a (potentially) very wealthy, industrialised state with a basically ethnically and culturally united people and a long history of central state authority. Contrast Afghanistan in 2001 (and today), where there was no sustained history of any sort of central authority providing law for the entire territory, where three-quarters of the population can neither read nor write, where there is a history of endemic warfare and conflict. Ethnic relations are calm at present but divisions remain. The country has never experienced industrialisation. There is no national transport or communications network. And so on. If international troops were to pull out of Afghanistan next year, citing "self-determination", the result would likely be worse than the situation pertaining today. On any scale of state development, Myanmar is closer to Afghanistan than Germany. The emergence of market-oriented democracy and human rights in Myanmar will be the work of decades.
Well, in the first place, Burma as a nation does technically have self-determination, doesn’t it? Insofar as its not ruled by a foreign power. It's just not democratic at present. In an ideal world, Burma would be a federal state, with the ethnic states having equal representation in parliament, a situation which would naturally conform to the longer history of Burma. The region which we call Burma is made up of several ethnic nationalities, several of which have alternately ruled kingdoms encompassing a greater part of the geographic area. They have well developed traditional political systems which would translate easily into modern democratic institutions. It was incompetency with which a central, Burman, authority was imposed on the region and triggered conflict in the first place. To compare Burma and Afghanistan is to only see Burma as it is today - underdeveloped and rife with conflict. But this situation is not endemic to the population, it was caused by the government itself.
But then, you could say the same for Afghanistan, couldn’t you? Who knows how successful Afghanistan would be now, if not for the cold war. Similarly, Afghanistan also had a, perhaps small, but still strong civil society in exile - where the principles of democracy and equal rights are strongly adhered too. This civil society was overlooked by the US in the process of building a new government, who instead chose to deal with the warlords. We can’t assume the present situation there is the natural result of Afghanistan’s make-up, and not the result of the choices made by the international community in dealing with them. The people of Burma are capable of making choices about the political situation in their country and it would be a mistake for us to ignore that, or to doubt their capability to undertake the reconciliation process. It will be a long process, but as outsiders, we can’t just decide that they aren’t up to the task. And if there’s any stereotype which could be applied to Asia, it’s that given the freedom, the people are incredibly and naturally capable of building a capitalist market economy. Comparing Burma to East Timor or the Phillipines would give us an entirely different perspective on the matter, wouldn't it?
In the case of Myanmar, both the hoped-for incentive to good behaviour and the desire for international respect and belonging have been blunted or removed the approach of Myanmar’s neighbours and the paranoid, broadly isolationist character of the SPDC......America must be willing to revisit these sanctions, because they have served no visibly useful purpose. Blocking one’s own companies and individuals from investing in and trading with another country, on grounds of the nature of the other country’s government, tends not to improve either the human rights protection or standard of living (as measured by income) of the poor. At any time, free trade should be a moral imperative and some likelihood of success must exist before punitive trade sanctions are imposed; evidence of success should be required before they are renewed. To what such evidence can the US point?
Fair enough, sanctions aren’t working. But I’d hesitate to throw the baby out with the bath water. Sanctions will never overthrow a government, but that doesn’t mean they can’t be useful in combination with other strategies. Sanctions in Burma, as Aung San Suu Kyi has called for, are less for overthrowing, and more to prevent ‘entrenchment’. Once companies and governments start doing business with the SPDC, it won’t be long before we forget they shouldn’t be there. We start to believe that Burma is somehow ‘predisposed’ to authoritarian rule, and become complacent in challenging it. Economic interests will supersede moral or political interests. Furthermore, its a matter of not financially supporting the regime, and making some effort not to completely use up the country's resources before the people have some say in their management. Not doing business there hasn’t worked in the absence of other strategies, but there is no evidence that doing business there would help, either.
“Not only that, but it is likely that US experts and investment would have precisely the reverse effect and would help the (eventual) emergence of a market-oriented democracy in Myanmar.”
Actually, I don’t believe it is likely. This hypothesis relies entirely on the corporations to conduct business ethically in order to promote democracy/human rights. And not even Western companies have proven their ability to do so in the absence of government regulations. Currently, Chinese corporations which import lumber from Kachin State for furniture produced in the south of China earn an average annual income of $1 billion US. That’s an absurd number, and yet, the people of Kachin State are no better off - and probably worse off, than those in states without such foreign investment. The SPDC uses their investment as another tool in their practice of ‘Burmanization’, which effectively means they conduct business in such a way that the poorest do not benefit. Not even incidentally.
Far from it, the government routinely encourages Burman and Chinese business people to settle in ethnic areas and to exploit the natural resources, resulting in further loss of livelihood for the locals, and the poorest people. Its incredibly naive to think that similar would not happen with ‘Western’ investment. The Junta is careful to ensure the profits of investment only trickle down as far as their own pockets. A market economy would occur naturally in the absence of authoritarian rule, as Burma is not, and has never really been a communist country. The traditional economic systems have not simply disappeared with the oppression - they just aren’t allowed to operate. Furthermore, Burma is primarily an agrarian economy, but with the potential to be quite a successful, exporting, one. The people don’t need jobs working for foreign investors, they need their own land back, and the freedom to develop it as they choose. Burma is incredibly rich environmentally, a fact which would allow for the development of a successful economy without foreign owned sweatshops.
It is only by helping the Burmese economy grow - with the quid pro quo of more responsible government budgeting - that internal wealth and, eventually, demands for democratic rights will develop. In places like Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan, economic liberty presaged much greater political liberty.
More responsible government budgeting? Please. That is not going to happen. Burma is simply not like other places. “Demands for democratic rights will develop”? How much more demanding can they get, for god’s sake? The people of Burma know they are suffering under oppression, they don’t need economic development to tell them so. This isn’t a matter of ‘opening up’, as it has been in other nations. Consider China, economic development has led to leaps and bounds in terms of political development in the last two decades. But, the Chinese people in the past were denied information about the outside world, and they never wanted to overthrow the government. When the government opened the country economically, they did so out of a choice and willingness to make reforms, however gradual. This is simply not the case in Burma. The people know they are suffering, and the government has no interest in reforms. They personally profit from investment while manipulating it to support their political objectives of oppression and ethnic cleansing.
The circumstances of Burma are unique, and while its possible to learn lessons from other nations, one has to be careful in making appropriate comparisons. Our strategic approach to Burma definitely needs re-examining, but we need to do so with consideration for what the people of Burma want and expect. Overthrowing the SPDC may seem far reaching, but is it any more far reaching than expecting the SPDC to concede to reforms? Sanctions don’t work because they don’t need our money - but forgoing sanctions will only further play into their hands. We obviously need to think more laterally here, and move beyond ‘economic tools for political reform’, and perhaps try political tools for political reform. The NLD is not the only group representing the people, and we need to remember that as well. For most fighting the resistance, the ultimate end goal is not overthrowing the SPDC, it is rebuilding the country with a constitution that guarantees genuine federalism, and equal rights for all ethnic groups. They recognise this as a process, which has already begun, but which cannot proceed as long as the generals are in control.
Getting rid of the SPDC is integral, and however impatient we may get, is not something we should easily give up on. Who are we, as outsiders, to subvert the will of the people of Burma? How can we expect to bring about democracy through an economic process which is inherently undemocratic, so long as the decision to remove sanctions is done without consultation or approval of legitimate representatives of the people of Burma? We can’t be making policy decisions affecting a country if we don’t entirely understand it, and Burma deserves to be seen as more than what has happened in the last 20 years. What Burma needs is a new constitution, a democratically elected government, and a deliberate process of reconciliation. The SPDC will always be a barrier to that goal, regardless of the nation’s economic circumstances.